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We examine the relationship between education and mortality in a young population of 
Italian males. In 1981 several cohorts of young men from specific southern towns were 
unexpectedly exempted from compulsory military service after a major quake hit the region. 
Comparisons of exempt cohorts from least damaged towns on the border of the quake region 
with similar ones from neighbouring non-exempt towns just outside the region show that, by 
1991, the cohorts exempted while still in high school display significantly higher graduation 
rates. The probability of dying over the decade 1991-2001 was also significantly lower. 
Several robustness checks confirm that the findings do not reflect omitted quake-related 
confounding factors, such as the ensuing compensatory interventions. Moreover, cohorts 
exempted soon after high school age do not display higher schooling or lower mortality 
rates, thus excluding that the main findings reflect direct effects of military service on 
subsequent mortality rather than a causal effect of schooling. We conclude that increasing 
the proportion of high school graduates by 1 percentage point leads to 0.1-0.2 percentage 
points lower mortality rates between the ages of 25 and 35.  
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1 Introduction1
Education is strongly correlated with own health and life expectancy (Kitagawa and Hauser (1973),
Grossman and Kaestner (1997), Deaton and Paxson (1999), Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006)). Policy
makers are paying growing attention to this link as it suggests the possibility of eﬃciently designing
interventions that improve both quality of life and human capital. For example, the European Com-
mission recently restated its health strategy (European Commission (2007)) emphasizing the need to
integrate health in all policies and to recognize the links between health policy and other policy areas.
Improving the years of healthy life and reducing health disparities are major goals of the US Healthy
People 2010 ten-year health strategy (US Department of Health and Human Services (2000)).
The mechanisms underlying this empirical regularity can nonetheless be manifold. Education may
aﬀect health because more educated people tend to smoke and drink less, do more physical exercise,
monitor their health more closely (Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006)), are more likely to use newly
introduced drugs (Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg (2005)), are less exposed to job-related stress factors
and less at risk of unemployment (Marmot (2006), Sullivan and von Wachter (2009)), and can aﬀord
more expensive care2. However, these behavioral, environmental and endowment diﬀerences do not
fully account for the educational gradient in mortality and for its substantial strengthening over
recent decades (Cutler, Lange, Meara, Richards and Ruhm (2010)). A complementary explanation
for the empirical regularity may be that individuals in better health or with a longer life expectancy
1 The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy. We wish to thank Josh
Angrist, Iwan Barankay, David Card, Sabrina D’Addario and Franco Peracchi for their comments as well as seminar
participants at ESPE 2005, EEA 2006, SIE 2006, NBER Summer Institute 2007, EALE-SOLE 2010, the Bank of
Italy, Fifth Brucchi Luchino Workshop, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Warwick, ISER, the
University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, the University of Bologna and the Banco de Espa˜ na. We also thank Maurizio Lucarelli
and the staﬀ of Istat’s safecenter in Rome (ADELE Lab), for their assistance in accessing the data. We are especially
grateful to Debora Radicchia who worked with us at the early stages of this project. An unwritten version of this
research has been routinely presented under the title “The Eﬀects of Education on Youth Mortality”. Correspondence:
alfonso.rosolia@bancaditalia.it
2More generally, education may increase the ability to assess the consequences of certain habits or exploit certain
health inputs. Grossman (2006) distinguishes between allocative and productive eﬃciency. The former pertains to the
greater awareness on the part of the more educated of the health consequences of certain behaviors or choices; the latter
regards the ability of the more educated to make more in terms of health out of given inputs.6
have stronger incentives (Ben-Porath (1967), Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000), Jayachandran
and Lleras-Muney (2009)) or better chances (Case, Fertig and Paxson (2005)) to accumulate human
capital. Finally, the relationship could simply follow from the presence of common determinants of
both outcomes, such as an individual’s rate of time preference shaping both the investment in schooling
and that in health (Fuchs (1982)) or her family background (Currie and Moretti (2003)).
In this paper we investigate whether schooling aﬀects the mortality of young men in a quasi-
experimental setting. In 1981, young men born before 1966 and living in speciﬁc towns of southern
Italy were exempted from compulsory military service after a major quake hit the region a few months
earlier (Cipollone and Rosolia (2007)). Standard human capital theory (e.g. Ben-Porath (1967)) sug-
gests that this exemption should increase the incentives to stay in school: being released from military
obligations implies, all else equal, an increase in the proportion of one’s lifetime over which returns to
education accrue3. However, only younger exempt cohorts had the possibility of revising their human
capital accumulation plans. The exemption was granted to them while still in high school and before
becoming formally eligible for service. On the contrary, contiguous older cohorts were released from
any obligation shortly after becoming eligible, at an age beyond high school.
The intervention provides a potentially exogenous source of variation for schooling. However, the
exemption is clearly correlated with a major shock and with the ensuing compensatory interventions
that may have also had direct eﬀects on the outcomes of interest. To address this issue we develop a
research design that replicates an experimental setting in which the only diﬀerence among individuals
is exposure to the exemption and its timing over the life cycle. More speciﬁcally, we compare schooling
levels and subsequent mortality rates of cohorts from towns on the inner border of the quake region
exempt before and after reaching the eligibility age with those of similar non-exempt cohorts from
neighboring towns just outside the quake region. Inner treated towns were the least damaged by the
3In a recent paper, Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009) show that sharp declines in maternal mortality in Sri
Lanka led to higher investment in human capital for young women.7
quake, thus also unlikely to receive any compensation; neighboring control towns are geographically
close, thus largely sharing the same economic environment as treated towns but were excluded from
any quake related intervention4.
We ﬁnd that in 1981 high school drop-out rates of cohorts exempt before formal eligibility and
while of high school age are signiﬁcantly lower by 3.6 percentage points than those of similar cohorts
from control towns, consistently with the predictions of a standard human capital model; a similar
proportion of youths belonging to older exempt cohorts - released from military obligations after high
school age - substituted instead army service with labor market participation. Ten years after the
quake, in 1991, the ﬁrst group displays a signiﬁcantly larger share of high school graduates, by over 2
percentage points; all other observed circumstances of younger and older exempt cohorts ﬁve and ten
years after the exemption are not statistically diﬀerent from those of their non-exempt counterparts.
In particular, we do not detect diﬀerences in their employment rates. The probability of dying over the
next ten years, between 1991 and 2001, for the same younger exempt individuals is signiﬁcantly lower,
by 0.35 percentage points, about one fourth less than the ﬁgure recorded in comparable non-exempt
cohorts. No diﬀerence can be detected between older exempt cohorts and comparable non-exempt
ones.
The ﬁndings imply that the exemption led over 3,000 youths from the whole quake region to complete
high school instead of dropping out; over the subsequent decade 1991-2001, about 600 additional
youths in their mid-20s also survived into their mid-30s. The eﬀect on life expectancy at age 25 is
also substantial. Under the extreme assumption that the mortality rate reduction induced by the
exemption is limited to the ten years between age 25 and 35, life expectancy at age 25 increased by
about one quarter of a year. To put this change into context, between 1980 and 1990 life expectancy
at age 25 increased by about one year.
4 Card and Krueger (1994) pioneered this kind of research design in their study on minimum wages and employment
in New Jersey.8
The implied 2SLS estimate of the eﬀect of a one percentage point increase in the proportion of
high school graduates on mortality rates between the mid-20s and mid-30s suggests a statistically
signiﬁcant reduction of 0.1-0.2 percentage points, about one tenth of the baseline probability of death.
The main assumption required to interpret this ﬁgure correctly as the causal eﬀect of high school
completion on subsequent mortality is that military service has no independent eﬀect on health and
life expectancy. This identifying restriction ﬁnds support in our data: the decline in conscription rates
detected among older cohorts exempted when already beyond high school age is not associated with
either higher schooling or changes in subsequent mortality.
Only recently a variety of studies have addressed the nature of the relationship between schooling
achievements and health outcomes adopting appropriate techniques to overcome endogeneity and
reverse causality issues, generally ﬁnding support for the existence of an eﬀect of human capital on
health. Among others, Lleras-Muney (2005) ﬁnds that one additional year of schooling lowers the
probability of death over the next ten years by between 3.5 and 6 percentage points, an increase in life
expectancy at age 35 of about 1.7 years; Oreopoulos (2006) corroborates these results by using self-
reported health indicators and ﬁnds qualitatively similar eﬀects for UK cohorts exposed to increases in
minimum school-leaving age; Kenkel, Lillard and Mathios (2006) show that already by ages 35 to 42,
successful high school completion improves body mass indexes and reduces the probability of smoking,
two leading preventable causes of death; Deschenes (2010) shows that exceptionally larger cohorts at
birth display both higher average education levels and lower adult mortality. Clark and Royer (2010)
instead ﬁnd little evidence that changes to British schooling laws in 1947 and 1972 aﬀected subsequent
mortality.
Our paper complements the above evidence in several respects. First, we explore the relationship
between schooling and mortality in a younger population than the ones usually investigated. This is
likely to dampen the role played by factors that may induce a correlation between schooling and health9
due to the diﬀerent jobs, careers and wealth accumulation proﬁles higher schooling gives access to. For
example, Marmot (2006) discusses how job-related stress factors may partly account for diﬀerences
in mortality across socio-economic backgrounds; Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) document that job
displacement has signiﬁcant long-run eﬀects on individual mortality. Moreover, the presence of a
publicly provided universal health care system is further likely to weaken the eﬀects of income and
wealth diﬀerences.
Second, we study the mortality returns to high school graduation within a pseudo-experimental
framework that allows us to clearly identify the population exposed to treatment, that is potential
high school dropouts. The studies most similar to ours have instead focused on the eﬀects of addi-
tional education exogenously achieved at either younger or older ages. For example, Lleras-Muney
(2005), Clark and Royer (2010) and Oreopoulos (2006) study the mortality and health consequences
of increased education induced by changes in compulsory schooling age, typically much lower than
high school graduation age; Deschenes (2010) implicitly looks instead at returns to college graduation.
Third, contrary to those studies, our identiﬁcation strategy rests primarily on comparisons of mor-
tality of similar cohorts over the same time span thus further limiting the possibility of confounding
factors related to secular developments in schooling and mortality.
Finally, our results also contribute to the study of the determinants of human capital accumulation,
in particular by quantifying the relationship between schooling choices at young age and the length of
one’s potential working life. This ﬁnding has potentially interesting policy implications, for example,
for the assessment of reforms of retirement regimes and labor markets5. It is also at the heart of recent
eﬀorts to develop a uniﬁed theory of the demographic transition (Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and
Moav (2002), Cervellati and Sunde (2005)).
The paper proceeds as follows. We start with a description of the quake and related interventions.
5See, for example, the discussion in Heckman and Jacobs (2009)10
Next, we illustrate and motivate the research design underlying our analysis. We then quantify short-
and long-run eﬀects of exemption status and of military service avoidance on a set of relevant outcomes.
Finally, we present and discuss least squares and 2SLS estimates of the eﬀects of high school completion
on subsequent mortality. We then conclude.
2 Background
2.1 Compulsory military service and schooling
Military service has been compulsory for all Italian men until recently. Young men were subject to a
thorough medical check-up in the year they turned 18. If minimal health conditions were met they
were inducted as they reached the age of 19 and required to serve for 12-18 months depending on
the speciﬁc military corp assigned. However, the total time absorbed by conscription could be much
longer because of lengthy bureaucracy and because conscripts were inducted only a few times a year.
Finally, one-year deferments could be obtained provided the conscript was still participating in the
education system and deemed to be reasonably on track.
Although military service was structured not to interfere with the natural completion of high school
at 18-19 years old, being subject to this obligation could be a suﬃcient incentive for some marginal
individuals to drop-out: if high-school completion turns out to be unlikely, staying in school only to
defer service is suboptimal as this would only result in a delayed entry in the labor market and a
loss of earnings6. On the other hand, compulsory military service is unlikely to be an alternative for
marginal youths. Military service is unpaid, nor does it provide any kind of formal qualiﬁcation or
6Staying longer in school to defer military service could be optimal even when degree completion is unlikely if an
exemption is expected. For example, Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) exploit the likelihood of such events for a study
on the earnings consequences of military conscription in the Netherlands. However, such mass exemptions were extremely
rare events in Italy. Maurin and Xenogiani (2007) put forth an opposite argument. They argue that compulsory military
service provides incentives to stay in school just to defer it. However, the underlying theoretical explanation (Maurin
and Xenogiani (2005)) crucially relies on the absence of a ﬁnite time horizon, whereby deferring service comes at no cost
in terms of foregone earnings.11
training with subsequent market value, given that it involves mostly guard duties, physical and basic
military training.
2.2 The quake and the compensatory measures
Figure (1) shows the area of southern Italy hit by a major earthquake in November 1980. The area
was home to about 5 million persons (10 percent of the national population), and counted around
650 towns. The quake caused about 2,000 deaths and 10,000 casualties, mostly around the epicenter;
about 300,000 persons were in need of temporary shelter; 60 percent of the residential estate stock
was damaged in the epicenter and about 20 percent in the surrounding area (Ministero del Bilancio
e della Programmazione Economica (1981)). Beyond its direct eﬀects, the quake also represented a
major labor market shock, with employment in the two most directly aﬀected regions, Campania and
Basilicata, dropping by 1.2 percent in a year.
Compensatory measures were explicitly targeted to the set of towns identiﬁed as damaged in the
laws passed in the aftermath. Financial transfers were further linked to the extent of damages suﬀered
as reported by several government agencies (Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica
(1981)). In the subsequent three years the funds budgeted for recovery by the Parliament amounted
to roughly one ﬁfth of the GDP of the area.
2.3 The exemption from military service.
The relief package included the cancellation of military obligations for all men born before 1966 living
in the quake region who had not yet served, independently of the damages suﬀered by their hometown7.
Speciﬁcally, the exemption was ﬁrst introduced in March 1981 as the possibility of complying with
military duties by doing social work in one’s hometown for all those due to be drafted in 1981, 1982
7While economic support was clearly linked to the magnitude of damages suﬀered by the town, the exemption was
eventually extended to all towns in the administrative regions most hit by the quake. Thus, in several cases also to
youths from towns that were classiﬁed as undamaged.12
and 1983 and living in the relevant region when the quake struck. This was a major concession since
serving in the army involved moving in other areas of the country. Moreover, doing social work is not a
full-time commitment, does not require leaving one’s household and is generally compatible with school
enrollment. However, before the quake-related exemption social work was not a viable alternative:
service would last 24 months and the request had to be defended before a military commission in
lengthy selection procedure with a high chance of a negative outcome. Shortly afterwards laws were
proposed to cancel all military obligations for the same groups and the law was deﬁnitively introduced
in February 1982. The population targeted by the laws included all males eligible for draft in 1981,
1982 and 1983 and living in the quake region at the relevant date. This included youths turning 18 in
those years (i.e. those born in 1963, 1964 and 1965) who thus were exempted before becoming formally
eligible and still in high school and their older peers who had deferred service.
3 Research design
Our sample frame is designed so as to replicate an experimental setting in which the exemption is
as good as randomly assigned. This allows us to exclude that variation in the outcomes of interest
associated with exemption status is due to confounding factors, such as complementary measures
undertaken in the aftermath of the quake or unobserved characteristics.
For this purpose, we focus on individuals from towns that lie on the border of the quake region
(ﬁg. 2). Towns along the border but within the quake region were exposed to the exemption as well as
to the quake itself and possibly to other compensatory measures. Towns just outside the quake region,
on the other hand, were excluded from all quake-related measures. Overall, the sample consists of 117
towns (57 within the quake region and 60 just outside). The average town size is quite small, 7,700
people and the median is about 2,700. Inner towns are somewhat smaller: the median size is about13
2,500 against a median size of outer towns of 2,9008. The distance between neighboring towns lying
across the border is also small, about 6 miles on average and always below 16 miles.
This design has at least two appealing features. First, towns along the inner border of the quake
region suﬀered minor damages or none at all, as reported by the government agencies assessing the
consequences of the quake. Speciﬁcally, of the 57 towns, 18 did not record any damage, 15 towns
ranked at the very lowest level of the damage scale, meaning only very mild and limited damage was
suﬀered; the next 15 towns ranked below the median damage score and the remaining ones were slightly
above9. This means that these towns were generally not entitled to signiﬁcant compensatory ﬁnancial
transfers. However, all young men belonging to speciﬁc cohorts were still granted the exemption
from military service10. Second, geographic proximity between neighboring towns across the border
of the quake region implies that they largely shared the same economic environment. Thus, they were
exposed in a similar fashion to the deep economic recession ensuing the quake. More broadly, any
general equilibrium eﬀect of the quake probably had the same impact on similar individuals across
the border. This implies, in particular, that changes in schooling choices induced by changes in wages
and employment opportunities are of the same magnitude and accounted for in comparisons of similar
individuals across the border of the quake region.
The 1981 population census allows us to assess whether towns just outside the quake region represent
the appropriate counterfactual for towns just inside the region11. In particular, census data allow us to
8 Town sizes are computed as of 1979 from Istat population records.
9Speciﬁcally, the lowest level of the damage scale corresponds to situations in which no one was injured or died
because of the quake, less than 2 percent of the population lost their home, temporary shelter was needed for no more
than 5 percent of the population, less than 1 percent of residential estate was damaged and less than 0.5 percent was
declared inhabitable. Analogously, the highest damage level assigned to towns outside of the epicenter corresponds to
situations in which more than 10 percent of the population was injured or died, more than 20 percent lost their home,
temporary shelter was required for more than 40 percent of the population and more than 30 percent of residential estate
was declared damaged or inhabitable.
10Since the quake mostly aﬀected two administrative regions, Campania and Basilicata, the government eventually
decided to exempt all men in those regions irrespective of the actual damage suﬀered by their towns of residence, provided
they belonged to one of the two regions.
11Speciﬁcally, for all our analyses we had access to the entire population census and extracted all records pertaining to
the units of analysis. This allows us to avoid sampling issues related to the small size of the relevant units (town-cohort)
that would arise if we used the 5% public use census sample. Because of privacy legislation, access to the universe of
census records was possible only through the National Statistical Institute (Istat) safecenter, located in Rome, Italy.14
compare educational achievements and employment rates in the two groups of towns. Unfortunately,
the Italian census does not collect earnings and income data. We focus on the adult population,
speciﬁcally people aged 30-50 at the census date.
Figure (3) shows the age-speciﬁc diﬀerences in the percentage of high school graduates among the
adults living in inner and outer towns as of 1981 together with the associated 95 percent conﬁdence
interval. Diﬀerences are generally small and never statistically signiﬁcant at customary conﬁdence
levels although older cohorts in inner towns appear to be slightly less educated. The two groups of
towns are similar also in terms of employment rates. In this respect, the census allows us to compare
the populations also strictly before the quake, exploiting a recall question on employment status ﬁve
years earlier, in 1976. Figure (4) displays the estimated diﬀerences by age and the corresponding 95
percent conﬁdence interval, showing that before the quake employment rates were not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent.
One concern with this evidence is that the census was run one year after the quake. In principle,
there are at least two reasons why this could impair the relevant comparisons. First, populations from
inner towns might have migrated elsewhere because of the quake so that those observed in 1981 might
already be a selected subsample of those truly exposed to the quake and related interventions. Second,
even if there is no migration the comparison might already reﬂect the presence of diﬀerent eﬀects of
the quake. Geographic proximity should guarantee that both channels worked, if at all, in the same
direction in both groups of towns.
To address empirically the selection eﬀect induced by diﬀerential outward migration we examine
yearly gross outﬂow rates from the sampled towns between 1974 and 1987. These are on average
around 2 percent and the diﬀerence between towns just inside and just outside the quake region is an
order of magnitude smaller, around 0.2 percent. To establish whether the quake led to a larger outﬂow
from inner towns we regressed yearly outﬂow rates between 1974-1987 on a set of year dummies and15
their interactions with an indicator for towns inside the quake region. None of the interaction terms
was statistically signiﬁcant at customary levels: p-values are always well above 0.15 except for three
years (1977, 1978 and 1981) for which they are still larger than 0.0512. Moreover, an F-test of the
joint signiﬁcance of the interacted terms does not reject the null with a p-value of 0.3. Overall, it
seems that outﬂows were very similar between the two sets of towns, and relatively low both before
and after the quake, so that it is unlikely that the population living in the treated towns as of 1981
had changed signiﬁcantly and in a diﬀerent direction compared to towns lying just outside the border.
Finally, we explore whether the quake had diﬀerent eﬀects on labor market outcomes of adults in
treated and control towns. We exploit a retrospective question on employment status 5 years before
the census, as of 1976, to compute town-cohort speciﬁc changes in employment rates between 1976
and 1981. Figure (5) reports the cohort-speciﬁc estimated diﬀerence between treated and control
towns along with the 95 percent conﬁdence bands. None of the diﬀerence turns out to be statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels and the null that they are jointly zero cannot be rejected. Failure to
detect statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences further supports the assumption that the population from
sampled towns belonging to the quake region was not aﬀected by quake-related interventions and that
the direct eﬀects of the quake, if any, were similar in the two groups of towns.
4 Short and long-run eﬀects of avoiding military service.
In this section we explore the short- and long-run eﬀects of avoiding military service. We start by
documenting how exemption status granted while in high school or shortly after aﬀected a set of
relevant current and subsequent outcomes. We then turn to diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the
eﬀects of exemption status before formal eligibility for service.
12We estimated a weighted regression with weights equal to average population size between t and t + 1 clustering
standard errors at the town level.16
4.1 Preliminary evidence
Table (1) reports unconditional comparisons of schooling and other labor market outcomes of youths
from towns on the inner border of the quake region to those of similar youths from towns just outside
the region in the aftermath of the quake. Throughout the paper the observational unit is the cell
town and year of birth and all estimates are weighted by the number of individuals in the cell. We
focus separately on two groups of cohorts, youths born between 1963 and 1965 and between 1959 and
196113. When the exemption was passed the ﬁrst group was 16 to 18 years old, while the second
was 20 to 22. Individuals in the ﬁrst group were not yet eligible for service and thus could change
their schooling decisions; those in the second group were instead already beyond high school age. The
evidence discussed in the previous section supports the view that diﬀerences between exempt and
non exempt cohorts reﬂect the eﬀects of exemption status rather than those of confounding factors
correlated with exemption.
In rows A to C we look at the short run eﬀects of exemption status. We draw on the 1981 population
census which, importantly, was run in October, at the beginning of the school year. Therefore the
evidence describes quite precisely the enrollment decisions of the cohorts aﬀected by the exemption.
Youths born in 1963-65 were not yet eligible for service (row A). However, the proportion that was still
in high school at the 1981 census date was higher by 3.6 percentage points than that of non-exempt
counterparts (p-value 0.027; row B). Correspondingly, a lower percentage entered the labor market
(row C), reﬂecting a choice toward schooling consistent with the mechanism that a longer expected
working life increases the incentives to accumulate human capital (Ben-Porath (1967), Jayachandran
and Lleras-Muney (2009)). Youths born in 1959-61 had been exempt from military obligations soon
after becoming formally eligible to serve. In 1981 the percentage of conscripts was lower by 3.5
percentage points (row A), a proportion similar to that choosing education in younger exempt cohorts.
13We exclude the 1962 cohort from the comparisons as its members were 19 when the exemption was passed, an age
when it is hard to make assumptions about whether they were still in high school or already beyond it.17
The lower conscription rates basically translated into a higher labor market participation rate rather
than school enrollment (row C).
The lower part of table (1) draws on the 1991 population census to describe the long run eﬀects
of the exemption by comparing outcomes of exempt and non exempt youths belonging to the two
cohorts under analysis ten years after the exemption. The census also includes some retrospective
information as of 1986. Ideally, we would like to observe the same individuals in both data sources,
that is those living in sampled towns as of 1981. Unfortunately, the 1991 census does not provide
information about past place of residence. We thus proxy the town of residence as of 1981 with town
of birth14. The evidence discussed in the previous section suggests, however, that geographic mobility
is not a relevant issue in our speciﬁc sample.
The proportion of youths exempt before eligibility who completed high school by 1991 is higher by
2.3 percentage points than among similar non exempt ones (row D). The p-value of the unconditional
diﬀerence is 0.088 and compares with the much lower levels of signiﬁcance and point estimates close to
zero detected for the other long run outcomes and for all observable circumstances of the older cohort.
In particular, there is no statistically relevant diﬀerence in the proportion of males enrolled in formal
education or participating in the labor market as of 1986 (rows E-F) and as of 1991 (rows G-H). Also,
as of 1991 there is no diﬀerence in the proportion of those who had completed college between exempt
and non exempt youths in both cohorts (row I), consistently with the idea that individuals whose
behavior was changed by the exemption are those at risk of high school dropout, thus unlikely to
pursue a college education. To put the diﬀerence in high school completion rates in context, it implies
that in the entire quake region over 3,000 youths who would have otherwise dropped out managed to
14Proxying the place of residence at a young age with the place of birth is fairly customary, for example in the large
literature started by Angrist and Krueger (1991) exploring the eﬀects of changes in US compulsory schooling state laws.
For the sake of comparability we should have performed also the analysis on 1981 data on the basis of town of birth.
However, the 1981 census provides information on the place of birth only at the larger province level. Thus by using the
place of birth instead of residence we would have included in the sample also people likely to live in towns more strongly
exposed to the quake and to other compensatory interventions, invalidating the spirit of the research design.18
complete high school and around 200 in the sample of towns under investigation.
Finally, the last three rows of table (1) compare the probability of dying between 1991 and 2001. We
recover this measure by combining the information on the initial population at risk in cohort c born
in town j (Nc,j) from the 1991 population census with that obtained from the individual death data.
For each death, we observe the date of the event and a variety of individual characteristics including
town and year of birth. We recover the total number of deaths occurred over the relevant period in cell
{c,j} (Dc,j) and combine it with 1991 census data on the corresponding population at risk obtaining
Dc,j/Nc,j, the measure of interest. The data also include detailed information on causes of death,
according to the 9th release of the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases15. The evidence shows that
the probability of dying over the decade 1991-2001 was lower among exempt 1963-65 cohorts by 0.34
percentage points (p-value: 0.034). At the same time, the diﬀerence among the two older cohorts
is basically zero, and is estimated with a similar degree of precision as that between the younger
cohorts. The diﬀerence among younger cohorts, as shown in the last two rows, is entirely due to a
lower incidence of natural causes16. The drop in mortality rates is quite substantial: it amounts to
about one fourth of the death rate from all causes estimated for non-exempt control cohorts and to
about one half of deaths due to natural causes only. The diﬀerence implies that in the entire region
targeted by the exemption about 600 males in their mid 20s who would have otherwise died earlier
reached their mid 30s. The eﬀect on life expectancy at age 25 is also substantial. Under the extreme
assumption that the mortality rate reduction induced by the exemption is limited to ages 26 to 36,
life expectancy at age 25 increased by about one quarter of a year. To put this in context, between
1980 and 1990 life expectancy at age 25 increased by about one year.
15See http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/icd/icd9.html.
16 We code deaths on the basis of the main cause as reported in the death certiﬁcate according to the 9th revision
of the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD9). We deﬁne natural deaths as those due to internal causes (codes:
0001-7999).19
4.2 Simple estimates of the long-run eﬀects of avoiding military service
The results presented above represent the change in outcome associated with a randomly oﬀered
exemption from compulsory military service, the so-called intention-to-treat (ITT) eﬀect. To infer the
eﬀects of not serving in the army on the outcomes of interest from the ITT it is necessary to quantify
the proportion of the cohort that did not serve because of the exemption. In principle, if retrospective
information on military status was available for the cohorts of interest, we should simply compare
the proportions of exempt and non exempt males that served in the army and use the diﬀerence as
denominator of a Wald estimate of the eﬀects of skipping military service. Unfortunately this is not
the case in our data. We observe individuals in 1981, only learning whether they are in service at
census date, and in 1991 and beyond, without any retrospective information on their military service
status. As the discussion below will make clear, the fact that military service was compulsory for all
males is not suﬃcient to conclude that the proportion of interest is close to unity.
To illustrate the point, we borrow from the average causal response approach notation (Imbens
and Angrist (1994)). Let {yi0,yi1} be, respectively, i’s outcomes when serving and not serving in
the army and Zi an index for the randomly assigned exemption status in a given cohort. Similarly,
let {Di0,Di1} be indexes of whether i does not serve in the army when exempt (Di1 = 1) and not
exempt (Di0 = 1). In principle the quantity of interest, that is the eﬀect of not serving in the army
(E(yi1 − yi0)), cannot be estimated because only one of the two potential outcomes is observed. The
ITT eﬀects reported in table (1) represent the diﬀerence in average outcomes by exemption status,
E(yi|Zi = 1) − E(yi|Zi = 0). Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that under speciﬁc assumptions the
following holds17:
E(yi|Zi = 1) − E(yi|Zi = 0) = E(yi1 − yi0|Di1 > Di0)P(Di1 > Di0) (1)
17Required assumptions are that Zi be independent of the potential outcomes and treatment assignments (i.e. as good
as randomly assigned) and that Di1 ≥ Di0 ∀i, i.e. the instrument shifts everybody’s behavior in the same direction.20
Therefore, the eﬀect of not serving on a given outcome can be estimated at least for the population
that does not serve because of the exemption (so-called compliers) provided the quantity P(Di1 > Di0)
can be measured. Even if military service is compulsory, this quantity is likely to be diﬀerent from
unity. On the one hand, there can be individuals who never serve (Di1 = Di0 = 1, the so-called
always-takers) because, say, of health conditions18; on the other, some individuals may choose to serve
independently of exemption status (Di1 = Di0 = 0, the so-called never-takers). More importantly, in
our setting this second group includes those that had already served when the exemption was passed
so that their behavior could not be aﬀected.
A tentative estimate of the quantity P(Di1 > Di0) can be obtained from the available data as follows.
Let s(a) be the proportion of conscripts at age a, so that s(a) = 0 if a ≤ 18, and C(a) = 1−
Pa
j=18 s(j),
the corresponding proportion who has not served by age a. The function C(a) can be approximated
by the cross-sectional relationship between age and the proportion in service in non-exempt towns at
the census date. The function, reported in the top panel of ﬁgure (6), shows that about 30 percent of
eligible males serve when 19 years old, an additional 20 percent at 20 years old, and so on. Importantly,
about 30 percent of eligible males has not served by age 35 and presumably will not serve thereafter.
Therefore, the proportion of always-takers (P(Di1 = Di0 = 1), i.e. those that always skip service) is
about 0.319.
Consequently, the proportion of males of a given age who did not serve because of the exemption
can be estimated as follows. Let ˜ s(a) be the proportion of youths of age a from exempt towns who
report being in service at census date. Then the proportion of those who did not serve because of
the exemption can be proxied by ˜ C(a) = 1 −
Pa−1
j=18 s(j) − ˜ s(a) under the assumption that all those
18Alternatively, there may be institutional reasons. For example, the Italian law gave the chance to third-born and
beyond male children not to serve if their older brothers had already complied with military obligations.
19This proportion is remarkably consistent with what can be estimated from the Indagine Longitudinale sulle Famiglie
Italiane (ILFI; http://www.soc.unitn.it/ilﬁ/eng.index.html). The survey was started in 1998 with a full set of retro-
spective information on a representative sample of about 5,000 Italian households. Individuals were also asked whether
they were ever drafted for compulsory military service (see Pisati and Schizzerotto (2004) for details). The nationwide
proportion of adult males reporting never to have served in compulsory military service is between 0.25 and 0.3 and
fairly stable across cohorts (data available upon request).21
who have not yet served when exempted will not do so in the future. That is, we assume that until
age a − 1 (or, alternatively, 1980) youths from exempt towns served in the army as youths from non
exempt towns and then, because of the exemption, all were freed except those who were already in
service in 1981. The lower panel of ﬁgure (6) reports for each cohort the estimated proportion of men
from exempt towns who did not serve in the army. All youths exempt before formal eligibility were
freed from service, while only about a half of the cohorts born between 1959 and 1961, exempt after
formal eligibility, had not yet served when exempt. For all groups, it is likely that one fourth of the
initial population would not have served anyways. Therefore, among the 1963-65 born the quantity
P(Di1 > Di0) ≈ 0.7, and about 0.2 for the 1961-59 born.
Combining the results of table (1) with this information as suggested by equation (1) yields a Wald
estimate for the increase in the probability of completing high school induced by not serving in the
army among males younger than 19 of approximately (2.3/0.7)≈3.3 percentage points with a standard
error of (1.33/0.7)≈1.920. Similarly, among the same population, the absence of military service
reduces the probability of dying between the mid-20s and mid-30s by (0.34/0.7)≈ 0.5 percentage points
(s.e. (0.16/0.7)≈0.23) and by about 0.56 percentage points (s.e. (0.12/0.70)≈0.17) the incidence of
deaths by natural causes. Other outcome diﬀerences among youths born in 1963-65 remain statistically
not signiﬁcant.
4.3 DD estimates of the eﬀects of exemption status
The results reported in table (1) are obtained by simple comparisons of similar cohorts from exempt
and non exempt towns. We now turn to a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework to quantify the eﬀects
of exemption status at a young age. This allows us to control for potentially omitted determinants of
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the outcomes of interest. Speciﬁcally, we exploit the fact that older cohorts were either unaﬀected or
exposed to a much more limited extent to the exemption to control for unobservable town eﬀects and
for secular trends in the outcomes of interest. In table (2) we report estimates for β from models of
the type:
ycj = α + βEcj + γXcj + µc + δj + ecj (2)
in which ycj is the average outcome of interest in cohort c from town j, Xcj are observable charac-
teristics of cohort c from town j, µc and δj are, respectively, cohort and town ﬁxed eﬀects and ecj a
residual. Ecj = 1 for cohorts from exempt towns born in 1963-65, exempt before formal eligibility,
and zero otherwise21. Row headings describe the dependent variables while columns correspond to
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the control set or underlying samples.
In columns (1) to (3) we focus on males born between 1956 and 1965 in treated and control towns.
We start by including town and year of birth dummies (col. 1). Town dummies capture all unobserved
heterogeneity across towns, including potentially diﬀerent - direct and indirect - eﬀects of the quake
that are common across contiguous cohorts from the same town. The proportion of youths exempt
while in high school who by 1991 had completed the degree is about 2 percentage points higher (p-
value: 0.059); no diﬀerence exists as concerns school enrollment or college graduation or the degree of
participation in the labor market as of 1991. Diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant also as of 1986,
suggesting that exemption status did not alter the progression into the labor market or the choice
between school and employment in a long-lasting fashion. This is consistent with the argument that
the intervention aﬀected the choices of youths at risk of dropping out, thus unlikely - upon high school
completion - to go further ahead in the educational track. Diﬀerences in mortality rates remain of the
same order of magnitude and signiﬁcance level than those estimated by unconditional comparisons of
similar youths in table (1). Inclusion of a quadratic in cohort size (col. 2) to absorb within-town of
21Estimation at the cohort-town level eliminates the problem of within cohort-town correlation of residuals (Moulton
(1986)). Inference based on DD estimates may still suﬀer from neglected serial correlation of residuals (Bertrand, Duﬂo
and Mullainathan (2004)). We address this possibility by clustering robust standard errors at the town level.23
birth heterogeneity due, for example, to local congestion eﬀects and of heterogeneous cohort eﬀects
(col. 3) does not substantially change the picture22.
In columns (4) and (5) we replicate the exercise of column (3), restricting the sample to cohorts born
between 1959 and 1965. This implies that, as shown before, all cohorts were exposed to a signiﬁcant,
although diﬀerent, extent to the exemption. Moreover, because in 1981 individuals belonging to these
cohorts were between 16 and 22 years old they were still cohabiting with their parents. This allows
us to include controls for a number of parental characteristics at the town-cohort level23. Even in this
limited sample and with parental controls, we still detect a rather signiﬁcant increase in high school
completion rates of about 2 percentage points and a decline in death rates of about 0.3 percentage
points among younger exempt cohorts.
In column (6) we perform a complementary exercise and estimate equation (2) on the sample of
males born in 1963-65 and in 1956-58. With respect to the previous exercise we thus exclude from
the sample youths born in 1959-61 a quarter of whom was likely aﬀected by the exemption. On
the contrary, in the sample underlying column (6) older cohorts are completely unaﬀected by the
exemption as all of them were at least 23 when exempt. However, this does not allow us to control
for parental characteristics since as of 1981 many of the older cohorts were no longer living with their
parents. Results conﬁrm the increase in high school completion rates in young exempt cohorts and
the decline in mortality between 1991 and 2001.
In column (7) we restrict the sample to youths from the 33 exempt towns that either did not record
any damage or were at the lowest of the oﬃcial damage scale and to their 41 direct neighboring towns.
22Heterogeneous cohort eﬀects are captured by a set of interactions of cohort dummies with dummies for 5 geographic
regions obtained dividing the sample, from north to south, into 5 non-overlapping groups of towns containing treated
and control towns.
23The 1991 census does not provide information on family background. We thus recover the information from the
1981 population census as follows. For each town and cohort, we select all households living in the town in 1981 with
a male belonging to the relevant cohort and compute the employment rates and educational achievement of parents. In
1981 the males in the relevant sample were 16 to 23 years old, thus largely still living in their parents’ household (see
Manacorda and Moretti (2006) for a discussion of the motivations of Italian youths to live in the parental household).
Unfortunately, the 1981 census does not collect information on income or wealth.24
Because this subset of treated towns was only exposed to the exemption, the exercise allows us to
rule out the possibility that previous estimates reﬂect the presence of cohort-speciﬁc eﬀects of the
quake unrelated to the exemption, for example due to the fact that only younger cohorts responded
to the limited income transfers assigned to sampled treated towns. The increase in the high school
graduation rate and the decline in mortality rates are now larger and more precisely estimated, while
all other outcomes as of 1986 and 1991 remain not statistically signiﬁcant from zero.
Finally, in columns (8) and (9) we perform two robustness checks. In column (8) we compare
youths born in 1959-1965 in control towns to similar ones from towns further outside the quake region
imputing the exemption status to youths born in 1963-65 to those born in control towns. This provides
an indirect test of the presence of direct eﬀects of the quake that aﬀect diﬀerently speciﬁc cohorts and
change with distance from the epicenter. If younger cohorts were aﬀected diﬀerently by the quake
as compared to older cohorts from the same towns and if, as it seems reasonable to assume, these
eﬀects decay continuously with distance from the epicenter, we should expect to ﬁnd some diﬀerence
also when comparing younger males from control towns to similar ones from towns less exposed to
the quake shock, such as those further out of the quake region. Results show no diﬀerence along
any dimension, further supporting the interpretation of previous results as determined by exemption
status rather than by other quake-related unobserved eﬀects.
In column (9) we estimate equation (2) on youths born between 1953 and 1961 in treated and
control towns and impute exemption status to youths born in 1959-61 in treated towns. As discussed
above, a signiﬁcant proportion of youths in these cohorts had not yet served when exempt. Yet they
were beyond high school so that we do not expect to detect any diﬀerence with respect to comparable
non exempt youths as concerns schooling. Importantly, because a large proportion did not serve
in the army, evidence that their mortality rate changed would suggest that military service has an
independent eﬀect on health. Again, outcomes of youths born in 1961-59 in exempt towns are not25
statistically diﬀerent from those of the same cohorts from non exempt ones. In particular, estimated
diﬀerences in mortality rates have p-values in the order of 0.5 thus supporting the assumption that
military service has no direct eﬀect on adult health.
To sum up, the evidence reported in table (2) conﬁrms that exemption status granted while still in
high school led to a statistically signiﬁcant increase in graduation rates from high school and to lower
adult mortality rates between the mid-20s and mid-30s while not aﬀecting other relevant outcomes.
Additional evidence (not reported) suggests that the ﬁndings are not due to the linear nature of the
empirical models. Estimation of probit models on the same samples and deﬁnitions of the control set
yield remarkably similar results. Furthermore, somewhat surprisingly the decline in mortality appears
to be due to a dramatic reduction of deaths by natural causes rather than by accidents. To this we
turn in the concluding discussion. In the next section we discuss the implied 2SLS estimates of the
eﬀects of high school completion on subsequent mortality.
5 The eﬀect of schooling on mortality
Our purpose is to establish whether education has a causal eﬀect on subsequent mortality. Letting mi
be an indicator of whether individual i died over a given time spell, hi her school achievement at the
beginning of the spell and Xi an individual’s observable characteristics, the relationship of interest is:
mi = θhi + βXi + ￿i (3)
with ￿i an i.i.d. residual. Reliable causal inference requires that the variation in schooling identifying
θ is independent of other determinants of mortality. As discussed above, this is likely not to be the
case.
Exemption from compulsory military service provides an ideal source of exogenous variation in
schooling achievements because it extends the length of one’s potential working life, a major determi-26
nant of human capital accumulation decisions (Ben-Porath (1967)). As shown by Eckstein and Wolpin
(1999), high school dropouts have signiﬁcantly lower expected valuations of graduation. Therefore, an
exogenous increase of the time span over which the beneﬁts from a high school degree are reaped could
increase the overall valuation of completing the degree, at least for some individuals. Alternatively,
the simple lack of the external constraint imposed by military service could have induced some of the
less motivated individuals to stay on and complete the degree.
In our setting, youths from the quake region born before 1966 were simultaneously exempt from
compulsory military service. Because they were at diﬀerent points of their life cycle, however, ex-
emption status modiﬁed in diﬀerent ways their incentives leading to diﬀerent choices. Those born
in 1963-65 were exempt before becoming formally eligible, when still of high school age and able to
change their human capital accumulation strategy. On the contrary, older individuals were exempt
after high school age and when already formally eligible for service. Keane and Wolpin (1997) show
that drop out decisions are fairly irreversible so that youths who had not completed high school were
unlikely to go back once exempt.
5.1 Instrument validity
The randomly assigned exemption from military service can serve as instrument for schooling in
estimating the eﬀects of the latter on subsequent mortality provided it does not aﬀect directly or
through channels other than schooling the outcome of interest.
As concerns the possibility that exemption enters subsequent mortality through other channels, for
example because the exemptions correlated with compensatory interventions, the previous discussion
has shown that exemption status is only associated with signiﬁcantly higher schooling achievements
and lower mortality rates among young exempt cohorts, while leaving unaﬀected all other observable
circumstances. However, the following empirical analysis will address this possibility in more detail.27
As concerns the direct eﬀects of military service on health, the conventional presumption is that
army service increases unhealthy behavior and exposure to harmful environments. Yet, several recent
studies that use the Vietnam draft lottery do not ﬁnd increased mortality, worse health conditions or
more unhealthy behavior among Vietnam veterans years after discharge (among others, Angrist and
Chen (2007), Dobkin and Shabani (2009), Conley and Heerwig (2009)). On the contrary, Bedard and
Deschenes (2006) show that WWII and Korean War veteran status is associated with higher mortality
and morbidity rates 20 to 50 years after discharge but relate this to increased smoking induced by
freely available cigarettes. These settings, however, are not fully comparable with compulsory military
service in peace time when most of the activity reduces to physical exercise, military training and guard
duties. Indeed, because conscripts are subject to continuous monitoring and harsher punishment for
misbehavior, we conjecture that certain unhealthy habits (e.g. drugs and alcohol use) could even be
lower than among comparable non-conscripts. Moreover, there are strong incentives to undertake
medical checks when in the army because all duties are temporarily suspended thus leading to better
health monitoring. Overall, from a theoretical point of view it is at least unclear whether a direct
eﬀect of military service should exist in our setting.
Although the required exclusion restriction cannot be formally tested, the research design allows for
some indirect inference based on the presence of reduced form eﬀects in samples with no ﬁrst stage24.
As shown above, about one fourth of the cohorts born in 1959-61 did not serve in the army because of
the exemption. Therefore, the absence of statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in subsequent mortality
rates between exempt and non exempt youths belonging to these cohorts suggests it is unlikely that
military service has independent eﬀects on mortality. In fact, we can predict what should have been the
diﬀerential mortality if the eﬀect detected among younger 1963-65 cohorts was due only to absence of
military service. Since among younger exempt cohorts about three quarters did not serve in the army
24Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2009) adopt a similar strategy in a study on the eﬀects of family size on oﬀspring’s
adult outcomes.28
because of the exemption we should expect a diﬀerence in mortality between older (1959-61) exempt
and non exempt cohorts of about -0.34(0.20/0.70)≈-0.1 percentage points, with an associated standard
error of 0.16(0.2/0.7)≈0.046 and 95 percent conﬁdence interval approximately equal to [−0.19,−0.006],
against an actual estimate of +0.02 (table (1) that lies instead outside the 95 percent conﬁdence bands.
Similar results are obtained if the same computation is based on the estimated diﬀerences reported in
columns (5) and (6) of table (2). In particular, results in columns (6) and (9) are based on comparisons
of exempt and non exempt cohorts born, respectively, in 1963-65 and in 1959-61 with those born in
1956-58. In this case, if the eﬀect on mortality detected in column (6) was due to absence of service, in
column (9) we should have found a point estimate of about -0.066 with 95 percent conﬁdence interval
of [−0.21,0.075] instead of a non statistically signiﬁcant +0.16. Taken together, this evidence supports
the assumption that exemption from military service before formal eligibility is a valid instrument for
completed schooling in a setting where the variable of interest is subsequent mortality.
Under this assumption the ratio of the mortality rate diﬀerence between exempt and non exempt
younger cohorts to the high school graduation rate diﬀerential reported in table (1) provides a Wald
estimate of the eﬀect of increasing high school completion by one percentage point on subsequent
mortality rate of the cohort of about 0.34/2.23≈0.15 percentage points. The statistical signiﬁcance of
this Wald estimate is rather low. While this might reﬂect the lack of a signiﬁcant eﬀect of schooling
on mortality, it must be noted that it is based only on unconditional diﬀerences by exemption status
of similar cohorts. In the following section we thus move to a proper IV setting and show that these
preliminary indications resist the inclusion of a number of controls and several robustness checks.
5.2 LS and 2SLS estimates
Table (3) reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of completing high school on mortality rates
between the mid-20s and mid-30s. The excluded instrument is a dummy for exemption status from29
military service at age 16-18 (those born in 1963-65).
One concern with our strategy relates to the strength of the ﬁrst stage regression, that is the change
in schooling associated with exemption status before formal eligibility. While the statistical signiﬁcance
of the estimated increase in high school completion induced by exemption status based on the most
comprehensive speciﬁcation reported in column (6) of table (2) is acceptable at conventional levels (p-
value≈ 0.02), it might signal that the instrument is not suﬃciently robust: the associated F-statistic
is about 5.5, below both the conventionally suggested benchmark value of 10 to claim robustness of
the IV identiﬁcation (Staiger and Stock (1997)) and the more appropriate critical values tabulated
in Stock and Yogo (2005). This implies that standard tests have incorrect size, leading to wrong
inference on the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the structural parameters of interest. Recently, several
tests have been proposed that have correct rejection regions even under potentially weak instruments25.
In particular, a convenient test for a just-identiﬁed model with potentially weak instruments as ours
is the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test (Anderson and Rubin (1949), Moreira (2001)). For this reason, in
table (3) we report both the robust standard errors clustered at town level associated with the relevant
estimate (LS and 2SLS) and, for the 2SLS, the p-values associated with the weak-instrument robust
AR test.
In column (1) we focus on youths born between 1956 and 1965 in treated and control towns and only
include town and cohort ﬁxed eﬀects and a quadratic in cohort size. Least squares estimates show that
a 1 point increase in the percentage of high school graduates is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant
decline in 10-year adult mortality rates of about 0.015 percentage points. The corresponding 2SLS
estimate suggests a one order of magnitude larger decline which turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant
at conventional levels only for deaths by natural causes. Similar results are obtained in columns (2)
and (3) in which we restrict attention to younger cohorts born in 1959-65 and include controls for
25For a survey of the tests that are valid under weak instruments see Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002).30
parental background and, in column (3) allow for area-speciﬁc cohort eﬀects. In both cases, a 1 point
increase in the proportion of high school graduates signiﬁcantly lowers mortality rates by about 0.2
percentage points both for all deaths and for natural ones only. In column (4) the sample is further
restricted to towns with the least recorded damages still yielding a signiﬁcant and similar eﬀect.
In column (5) we check our results by including retrospective information on the proportion par-
ticipating in the labor market and in education as of 1986. In particular, if the lower mortality
detected among cohorts exposed to the exemption is a mechanical artifact of a longer stay in school
and consequent lower exposure to labor related risk factors we should expect the estimated causal
eﬀects to weaken. However, the results of column (5) are remarkably in line with those of the basic
speciﬁcation of column (1), also based obtained on the sample of 1956-65 born in treated and control
towns. In column (6) we further augment the control set with the proportion in the labor market
in 1991. Similarly to the one above, this exercise accounts for the possibility that education aﬀects
mortality rates indirectly, through the better working opportunities it commands, rather than directly,
for example through cognitive or information processing abilities. Again, we ﬁnd that point estimates
are unchanged although estimated somewhat less precisely.
Finally, in columns (7) and (8) we replicate two placebo experiments. In column (7) we impute
exemption status to youths born in 1963-65 in control towns and verify whether 2SLS estimates are
signiﬁcant in a sample of 1956-65 born in control and outer control towns, none aﬀected by the
exemption. Consistently with our expectations, the estimated eﬀect is highly non signiﬁcant. In
column (8) we perform a similar experiment on cohorts born in 1953-61 from treated and control
towns imputing exemption status to youths born in 1959-61 in control towns, exempt when beyond
high school. Again, the 2SLS turns out to be non signiﬁcant even if, as shown above, about one fourth
of the 1959-61 cohort from exempt towns did not serve in the army because of the intervention.31
5.3 Discussion
The results suggest that high school completion lowers subsequent mortality rates by a signiﬁcant
and quantitatively relevant amount: increasing by 1 percentage point the proportion of graduates
reduces subsequent 10-year mortality rates by 0.1-0.2 percentage points. Three facts stand out from
our results. First, LS estimates are in absolute value much lower than 2SLS ones in all speciﬁcations,
a ﬁnding common to studies similar to ours (e.g. Lleras-Muney (2005)), against the a priori that the
sources of bias in LS estimates would imply lower absolute values of 2SLS estimates. Second, the
2SLS suggest very large eﬀects of education on subsequent mortality, especially through a reduction
of the incidence of natural causes. Speciﬁcally, completing high school would lower the individual
10-year probability of death between the mid-20s and mid-30s by 10-20 percentage points. While the
range of variation of these estimates also reﬂect the sample choice, we note that in most cases they are
not too far away from those reported by Lleras-Muney (2005) and Deschenes (2010) based on older
populations than ours. Third, the estimated eﬀect stems almost exclusively from a decline in deaths
by natural causes.
Several non exclusive arguments can account for the ﬁrst two features. If the bias induced by
measurement error in self-reported schooling dominates that due to omitted variables correlated with
education, 2SLS estimates would be larger than LS (e.g. Card (2001)). Another explanation relates
instead to the speciﬁc instrument used in the analysis: if treatment eﬀects vary across individuals
conventional IV estimators yield the eﬀect of treatment on the population whose behavior is changed
by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist (1994), Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)). Therefore, if
education aﬀects subsequent mortality diﬀerently the 2SLS reﬂects the average eﬀect among those
aﬀected by the exemption, that is youths at risk of dropping out who choose to stay longer in school
if exempt from military service, the LATE. Moreover, Angrist and Imbens (1995) show that coding
a multivalued treatment variable in a binary fashion generally leads to estimates of the causal eﬀect32
of interest that are larger than the true causal response26. Therefore, if mortality rates respond to
the actual number of years of schooling rather than to high school completion the resulting estimate
will generally be larger than the causal eﬀect of one additional year of schooling27. Indeed, a simple
Wald estimate of staying at least one additional year in school obtained as the ratio of the mortality
diﬀerential between exempt and non exempt cohorts to the high school enrollment diﬀerential as of
1981 (3.6 percentage points, row B in table (1)) suggests a weaker mortality decline of 0.1 percentage
points. The magnitude of the eﬀect is more in line with that estimated by Lleras-Muney (2005)
on older individuals exposed in their teens to changes in compulsory schooling and child labor laws
in the US; she estimates that one additional year of schooling lowers the 10-year mortality rate of
individuals in their 40s to 60s by 3.7 to 6.1 percentage points. Finally, the estimated eﬀect may reﬂect
the presence of spillover eﬀects of individual education on group members behavior. For example,
better individual habits determined by higher schooling may positively inﬂuence the habits, behavior
and preferences of peers independently of their educational achievements28. These eﬀects have been
documented extensively, especially with reference to deviant behavior: Case and Katz (1991), Gaviria
and Raphael (2001), Kawaguchi (2004), Bayer, Pintoﬀ and Pozen (2009) ﬁnd evidence that criminal
behavior, drugs and alcohol use and smoking are heavily inﬂuenced by one’s peers; evidence in Kremer
and Levy (2008) and De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010) suggests that peer eﬀects may reﬂect
26Speciﬁcally, they show that the 2SLS estimate of a model with variable treatment intensity can be interpreted as
the weighted average of the treatment eﬀects of a unit increase in the treatment at each treatment level aﬀected by the
instrument; the weights associated to these unit treatment eﬀects are the (normalized to 1) proportion of the population
whose treatment at the speciﬁc juncture is modiﬁed by the instrument.
27Intuitively, by coding schooling in a binary fashion, the standard interpretation of the 2SLS traces all the change in
mortality in a group to the change in the proportion of high school graduates, while mortality can be lower also because
some of those who did not complete high school still acquired more schooling because of the exemption.
28Formally, if mortality of person i in group c (mic) is determined by her own education hic and average education in
the group Hc = E(hic|c) by mic = βhic +γHc +eic, then the relationship between the proportion of deaths in the group
Mc = E(mic|c) and average education Hc is Mc = (β+γ)Hc +ec. To disentangle the two eﬀects in our setting we would
need to have an identiﬁable subset of group c not be aﬀected by the exemption so as to study their mortality in relation
to the exemption status of the targeted population ((e.g. Cipollone and Rosolia (2007), Laschever (2009), De Giorgi and
Angelucci (2009)). A candidate subpopulation in our case would be females, who are not subject to military service but
presumably interact with young men of the same cohort in the same town. However, in a companion paper (Cipollone
and Rosolia (2007)) we document the presence of peer eﬀects in education that led also young women from exempt towns
to increase their education achievements in response to the higher achievement of young men. Moreover, females might
not be a suitable candidate because they are exposed to quite diﬀerent causes of death. Deschenes (2010) shows that
female adult mortality rates are not aﬀected by cohort size at birth, contrary to male ones.33
changes in individual preferences rather than in choice sets.
Perhaps the most surprising ﬁnding is that the mortality reduction associated with higher schooling
is driven exclusively by a decline in deaths due to natural causes while deaths due to accidents or
violent causes are largely unaﬀected. Unfortunately, the nature of the research design limits the
sample size considerably, thus preventing a further investigation into the incidence of speciﬁc natural
causes. However, we conjecture that the observed eﬀect might be driven by a decline in drugs- and
alcohol-related deaths. On the one hand, alcohol and drugs consumption are presumably the main
causes of death that can be manipulated by individuals and whose consequences may emerge in a
relatively short space of time29. For example, Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) show that in the US
the number of deaths increases by as much as 10 percent at age 21, the federal minimum drinking
age. They show that this increase is only due to external causes, a deﬁnition that pools accidental
and violent causes (motor vehicle accidents, homicides, suicides) together with deaths with an explicit
mention of alcohol or drugs. Noticeably, these deaths alone, which would be coded as natural causes
in our framework, increases by as much as 30 percent at age 21, suggesting that increased alcohol
consumption may have immediate and extreme consequences on a youth’s health. On the other hand,
they represent activities for which strong peer eﬀects have been documented, thus potentially leading
to a considerable ampliﬁcation of the initial direct individual eﬀects.
Moreover, epidemiologists have long recognized the diﬃculties in precisely relating a given death
episode to substance or alcohol use (for a survey see Darke, Degenhardt and Mattick (2006)). While
there are circumstances when this is an easy task (for example, clear episodes of overdose), in most
cases death occurs for reasons that may or may not be determined by such behaviors, such as heart or
kidney failure or hepatitis. In these cases only careful toxicological examination or deep knowledge of
the deceased person’s habits can inform the report on the speciﬁc causes of death. This information
29Other leading death causes can, in principle, be manipulated but the eﬀects are likely to be seen over a longer time
period. For example, reduced smoking, increased physical activity and better food tend to reduce cardiovascular failures
and cancer occurrences at older ages.34
is rare and typically collected only if the death is part of a criminal event. Therefore, even in larger
samples than ours, a decline in drugs- or alcohol-induced deaths could easily reﬂect into a lower number
of deaths by natural causes.
Finally, we suspect that in addition to these objective diﬃculties, misclassiﬁcation can arise because
a physician reporting the cause of death may intentionally avoid to mention drugs or alcohol as
concurring factors to spare the family a social stigma. This motive is likely to be relevant in the
environment we study, characterized by small town size, a markedly traditional culture and strong
social ties.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have exploited the unexpected mass exemption from compulsory military service
granted to several cohorts from speciﬁc Italian towns hit by a quake in 1980 to identify the eﬀects of
high school completion on subsequent mortality. Results are based on comparisons of youths living
on the border of the quake region exempt from military service at diﬀerent ages with comparable
non-exempt youths from nearby neighboring towns. The speciﬁc research design allows us to assume
away the presence of omitted confounding factors, possibly related with the quake and the ensuing
compensatory interventions, as well as other systematic diﬀerences between exempt and non-exempt
youths.
We ﬁnd that cohorts exempt when still of high school age did attend school for longer. The pro-
portion of youths still enrolled in high school shortly after the exemption was granted increased by
3.6 percentage points. This is in line with theoretical arguments that a longer expected working life
fosters human capital accumulation. Ten years later the proportion of high school graduates among
exempt cohorts was higher by over 2 percentage points; cohorts exempt shortly after high school age
instead did not revise their schooling choices. Over the decade 1991-2001, the overall mortality rate of35
youths exempt before formal eligibility for military service was lower by about 0.3 percentage points;
older exemptees display the same mortality rates as comparable non exempt cohorts, suggesting that
exemption from military service has no direct eﬀects on subsequent mortality.
The 2SLS estimates of the eﬀects of high school completion on mortality between age 25 and 35
implied by these results suggest that raising high school completion by ten percentage points would
reduce subsequent ten-year mortality rates by 1 to 2 percentage points. While the data do not allow us
to thoroughly explore the determinants of this causal link, several checks conﬁrm that the estimated
eﬀect is unlikely to be due to diﬀerences in the degree of labor market attachment induced by higher
schooling: employment rates 5 and 10 years after exemption are found to be broadly similar for exempt
and comparable non-exempt youths; moreover, conditioning 2SLS estimates also on these intermediate
outcomes does not alter the estimated eﬀect of high school completion on subsequent mortality.
In terms of individual probabilities of death, these estimates would imply that completing high school
reduces the probability of dying between the mid-20s and mid-30s by between 10 and 20 percentage
points. The magnitude of the eﬀect, while at ﬁrst surprisingly high, is only slightly stronger than that
obtained by Lleras-Muney (2005) for older individuals with an additional year of compulsory schooling
and roughly in line with that implied by results in Deschenes (2010). The size of the eﬀect can be
partly traced to the particular population aﬀected by the speciﬁc instrumental variable strategy,
namely youths at risk of dropping out, an interpretation consistent with the substantial diﬀerence
between 2SLS and OLS estimates of the eﬀect of schooling. Additionally, the research design does
not allow us to rule out the presence of spillover eﬀects in health behavior which, if present and
assumed away, mechanically amplify the estimated individual direct eﬀect. The estimated eﬀect is
driven almost exclusively by a decline in the incidence of natural causes. We argue this may reﬂect a
mismeasured decline in drugs and alcohol related deaths, possibly ampliﬁed by the presence of peer
eﬀects.36
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Figure 1: 1980 Earthquake.
Source: Oﬃcial report on the 1980 earthquake, Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica
(1981).
The ﬁgure shows towns that were hit by the quake. Darker areas represent more damaged towns.41
Figure 2: Treated and control towns
The ﬁgure shows inner treated towns (light) and outer control towns (dark). Southern treated towns
were granted the exemption although not included in the ﬁnal list of towns hit by the quake. See text
for details.42















30 35 40 45 50
Age in 1981
Source: 1981 population census.
The ﬁgure reports estimated diﬀerences in the share of male population with at least a high-school degree
in 1981 and the corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals based on robust standard errors. Estimates are
weighted by the number of observations in the town-age cell.43
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Age in 1981
Employment rate in 1976 (percent)
Source: 1981 population census.
The ﬁgure reports estimated diﬀerences in the share of male population employed in 1976 and in 1981
the corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals based on robust standard errors. Estimates are weighted by
the number of observations in the town-age cell.44











30 35 40 45 50
Age in 1981
Source: 1981 population census.
The ﬁgure reports estimated diﬀerences in the employment rate change between 1976 and 1981 and the
corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals based on robust standard errors. Estimates are weighted by the
number of observations in the town-age cell.45





























































































































































Source: 1981 population census.
Panel A reports the age proﬁle of compliance with military service as inferred from the cross-sectional
proportion of men from non exempt towns in service at the census date. Panel B reports for each cohort
the estimated proportion of men who did not serve because of the exemption (see text for details).46
Table 1: Treated and control: relevant outcomes by cohorts.
1963-65 1959-61
C T T-C C T T-C
A. Compulsory military service in 1981 0.4 0.5 0.11 10.5 7.0 -3.51
(0.13) (0.90)
B. Student in 1981 45.0 48.6 3.61 17.5 17.9 0.42
(1.63) (0.94)
C. In labor market in 1981 53.0 49.3 -3.73 70.4 73.2 2.85
(1.59) (1.44)
Obs. 17529 7511 15237 6868
D. Completed high school in 1991 34.2 36.4 2.27 34.8 34.0 -0.79
(1.33) (1.21)
E. Student in 1986 15.5 15.9 0.47 7.6 7.8 0.14
(0.81) (0.48)
F. In labor market in 1986 79.2 80.5 1.34 88.0 88.5 0.53
(0.89) (0.55)
G. Student in 1991 5.5 6.2 0.70 1.6 1.7 0.10
(0.45) (0.21)
H. In labor market in 1991 91.3 91.4 0.10 95.6 95.5 -0.07
(0.52) (0.33)
I. Completed college in 1991 4.4 4.3 -0.12 7.0 6.6 -0.42
(0.34) (0.48)
I. Dead between 1991 and 2001 by:
– any cause 1.4 1.1 -0.34 1.5 1.5 0.02
(0.16) (0.16)
– natural cause 1.0 0.6 -0.39 1.1 1.1 -0.04
(0.12) (0.13)
– accidental cause 0.4 0.5 0.05 0.4 0.4 0.06
(0.10) (0.09)
Obs. 18308 8264 18541 8763
Source: 1981 and 1991 population census.
The table reports percentages for cohorts exempt before and after formal eligibility in treated and control
towns and corresponding unconditional diﬀerences. Standard errors in parentheses.
Death rates deﬁned as the ratio of the total number of deaths between 1991 and 2001 in the relevant
birth year-town cell over population at risk in 1991 (see text for more details).
Rows A to C are based on town residents at the 1981 census date; rows D-I are based on town of birth
as reported in the 1991 population census.4
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Table 2: The eﬀects of exemption status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Completed high school in 1991 2.04 2.66 2.40 1.87 1.60 2.69 3.53 0.13 0.91
(1.071) (0.970) (0.852) (0.991) (1.021) (1.149) (1.392) (1.052) (0.931)
Completed college in 1991 0.25 -0.14 -0.03 -0.49 -0.63 0.22 0.03 0.21 0.28
(0.689) (0.546) (0.623) (0.687) (0.684) (0.653) (0.694) (0.433) (0.587)
Student in 1986 0.37 1.56 1.56 1.20 1.00 1.99 0.53 0.80 1.03
(1.975) (1.020) (1.142) (1.250) (1.252) (1.115) (1.204) (1.015) (0.771)
In labor market in 1986 1.21 0.01 -0.21 -0.26 -0.10 -0.22 0.88 -0.84 -0.78
(1.990) (1.147) (1.193) (1.231) (1.225) (1.201) (1.240) (1.197) (0.866)
Student in 1991 0.57 1.03 1.04 1.11 1.02 1.07 0.44 0.28 0.41
(1.064) (0.619) (0.678) (0.734) (0.736) (0.569) (0.717) (0.534) (0.382)
In labor market in 1991 0.23 -0.32 -0.40 -0.48 -0.40 -0.44 0.53 0.16 -0.77
(1.239) (0.803) (0.866) (0.951) (0.958) (0.701) (0.926) (0.771) (0.624)
10-year death rate (1991-2001)
Any cause -0.30 -0.29 -0.29 -0.38 -0.37 -0.23 -0.53 0.01 0.16
(0.165) (0.192) (0.192) (0.213) (0.213) (0.245) (0.293) (0.210) (0.189)
Natural causes -0.32 -0.32 -0.33 -0.35 -0.37 -0.31 -0.56 0.00 0.09
(0.116) (0.137) (0.137) (0.176) (0.177) (0.163) (0.257) (0.199) (0.153)
Accidents 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.07
(0.092) (0.100) (0.108) (0.113) (0.111) (0.145) (0.170) (0.080) (0.109)
Cohort size N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Parental chars. N N N N Y N Y Y N
Cohort FE Y Y N N N N Y Y N
Geo-Cohort FE N N Y Y Y Y N N Y
Town FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dependent variables are percentages. Weighted LS; weights are number of observations in town-cohort cell. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the town level.
Samples - cols. (1)-(3):1956-65, all (T,C) towns; cols.(4)-(5): 1959-1965, all (T,C) towns; col. (6): 1956-58 and 1963-65, all (T,C) towns; col. (7):
1959-65, only least damaged towns and neighbors; col. (8): 1959-65, control and non exempt outer neighbouring towns; col. (9):1953-61, all
(T,C) towns. See text for details.4
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Table 3: LS and 2SLS estimates of the eﬀects of schooling on adult mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LS 2SLS LS 2SLS LS 2SLS LS 2SLS LS 2SLS LS 2SLS LS 2SLS LS 2SLS
Total deaths
-0.015 -0.111 -0.020 -0.202 -0.018 -0.233 -0.007 -0.151 -0.014 -0.116 -0.014 -0.115 -0.010 0.042 -0.015 0.174
(0.007) (0.077) (0.011) (0.158) (0.011) (0.195) (0.011) (0.101) (0.007) (0.107) (0.007) (0.106) (0.009) (1.739) (0.009) (0.224)
[0.128] [0.099] [0.083] [0.0729] [0.218] [0.214] [0.979] [0.404]
Natural deaths
-0.012 -0.121 -0.017 -0.212 -0.012 -0.229 -0.013 -0.157 -0.012 -0.138 -0.012 -0.138 -0.003 -0.018 -0.014 0.098
(0.006) (0.059) (0.008) (0.145) (0.008) (0.174) (0.009) (0.086) (0.006) (0.091) (0.006) (0.090) (0.008) (1.451) (0.008) (0.173)
[0.021] [0.052] [0.041] [0.0341] [0.045] [0.042] [0.990] [0.562]
Coh. size Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Parental
chars. N Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Status in
-1986 N N N N Y Y N N
-1991 N N N N N Y N N
Fixed eﬀects for:
Town Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
Geo*Coh N N Y N N N N Y
The table reports LS and 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of the percentage with high school degree in the town-year of birth cell on the corresponding mortality
rate by all causes and by natural causes over the decade 1991-2001. 2SLS estimates obtained using as instrument for schooling a dummy EX for exemption
status. Robust standard errors clustered at town level in parentheses; p-value of weak-instrument robust Anderson-Rubin test statistic (χ2(1)) in brackets.
Cols. 1,5,6: born 1956-65 in treated and control towns, EX = 1 if born in 1963-65 in treated towns; cols. 2,3: born 1959-65 in treated and control towns,
EX = 1 if born in 1963-65 in treated towns; col. 4: born 1959-65 in least damaged treated and neighbouring control towns, EX = 1 if born in 1963-65 in
treated towns; col. 7: born in 1959-65 in control and outer control towns, placebo exemption assigned to born in 1963-65 in control towns; col. 8: born in
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